Speaking Notes for UNU Launch of Humanitarian Diplomacy Volume
New York City, Sept. 13, 2007
Larry Minear
Introduction
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Thanks to the sponsors of the event and to the underwriters of the research itself (UNU, WFP, and USIP).
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Thanks also to our presenters and commentators, and regrets from Hazel who was unable to be present for the occasion
Background of the research
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the idea was originally Hazel’s, fleshed out by the two co-editors in the selection of countries for case study review and individuals to identify lessons learned
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our March 2004 meeting in Bangkok reviewed initial drafts, discussed the concept and conduct of humanitarian diplomacy, and agreed on the 5-part template that guides each chapter: context, operational issues, obstacles/opportunities, negotiations, and wider implications
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our November 2004 meeting in Rome gave us a chance to refine our country studies and conclusions and to engage the issues with WFP.
What makes the volume special?
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it is written by practitioners rather than policy analysts, which has both positive and negative features
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it has a “dirty fingernail” quality as contrasted with the more manicured approach of card-carrying diplomats and the more theoretical constructs of academics
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our writers have institutional insights that outsiders sometimes lack, although the writers are not speaking for their agencies
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at a time of growth in the humanitarian sector and in the humanitarian studies field, the book offers a necessary and important building block
The book has several optics:
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first, the 14 case studies. The richness and diversity of country experience is exemplified by such chapters as Brian Walker’s on Cambodia under Vietnamese occupation (the approach he describes was contested by other agencies) and Nicholas Morris’ on the limits of humanitarian action in the Balkan
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second, and cutting across countries, the institutional aspect. Thus the volume highlights the approach of the ICRC (which has perhaps the most clearly articulated understanding of humanitarian diplomacy), the UN system (within which each UN organization has its own specificities), and NGOs (such as Peace Brigades International).
Taken together, one gets a picture of humanitarian diplomacy in action, both the small “d” diplomacy practiced by agencies in support of their programs, and capital “D” diplomacy conducted by diplomats. Issues related to division of labor and comparative advantage also emerge from the volume.
Following country presentations of Sudan and Afghanistan and comments by colleagues, we would like to solicit the audience’s thoughts about whether the concept of humanitarian diplomacy resonates with their experience and whether the operational challenges identified bear out the utility of the concept.
Masood Hyder:
A Case Study in Humanitarian Diplomacy
In early July 2000, less than three months after I had arrived in Khartoum, I was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There I found the whole diplomatic community assembled. The Foreign Minister of Sudan addressed us. He was, as I recall, in a high state of diplomatic outrage.
An outpost of the North, located deep in rebel-held territory, had been overrun. This was the garrison town of Gogrial, in Bahr el Ghazal. What enraged the FM was the fact that the opposition SPLA had taken it during a ceasefire.
After denouncing the perfidy of the South, the FM turned to me, the person representing the UN at the time, and asked me to convey his protest to the UN in NY. He expected a condemnation of the attack.
I duly reported to NY, suggesting that a response, however bland, would be helpful. I emphasized the desirability of a more proactive engagement in Sudan by the political arm of the UN.
But no reply was forthcoming. When it became evident that the UN would remain silent on the Gogrial incident, Sudanese frustrations were vented in other ways.
On 22 July, the President, Gen. Omar Bashir, gave an impassioned speech, in which he denounced the OLS, accusing it of supplying arms to the opposition. He mocked the OLS, calling it “Operation Bloodline”.
This was ominous. I immediately contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was assured that there was no change of policy or approach on the part of the Government. I followed this up with a meeting with the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, who also assured me that the OLS was not being accused but there was dissatisfaction about other non-OLS flights, “taking place in the shadow of OLS”. OLS flights from Lokichoggio in Kenya would be shadowed by illegal flights that sneaked into Southern Sudan behind the approved OLS flights. The Minister hinted that a review of OLS management might be necessary. But his overall tone was reassuring.
But the military interpreted the President’s speech differently, and there was a sudden outbreak of attacks on humanitarian flights. On 27 July, a Red Cross plane was bombed in Billing, Lake State. On 28 July, two WFP aircraft, carrying humanitarian staff and supplies were attacked on the ground in Bahr el Ghazal. These were all notified flights to approved destinations, as per the monthly schedule of humanitarian flights approved by the Government. Fortunately the attacks missed their targets and the aircraft returned unharmed. But the incidents were serious enough to alert the UN Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs, Ambassador Tom Vraalson. Vraalson was concurrently Norway’s Ambassador to Washington. He immediately contacted the Foreign Minister of Sudan by phone, and asked me to provide the Foreign Minister with details of the incident. This was done on 29 July.
At this point, the advice from my colleagues in Sudan was to stop all humanitarian flights. But I hesitated, for several reasons: First, Ambassador Vraalson had lodged a high-level protest. Second, flights would be easy to stop but difficult to resume. Third, the hard-line elements in the government would be only too pleased if OLS assistance to the South ceased altogether. Fourth, stoppage would give the Govt an excuse to reject the monthly schedule of flight clearances. If OLS was not flying, why would it need flight clearances? As the end of the month was approaching, I was anxious to ensure flight clearances for the coming month.
I needed to keep humanitarian operations going, but flying was becoming too dangerous. Was there any way to keep going, without risking attack? Studying their method of attack, we found a solution. At the time, the government’s method of attack was somewhat basic, and consisted in rolling bombs from the rear of Antonov cargo planes at targets on the ground; they did not have the capacity to engage in air-to-air attack. If our aircraft did not land in southern Sudan, they could not be attacked. On 29 July, I gave instructions that airdrops should continue, but airlifts should be suspended. The strategy of confining operations to airdrops was of course untenable over a long period, but I was only looking for short-term solutions, and doing everything possible to avoid a confrontation
On 31 July 2000, clearance was received for OLS flights for the month of August. On 2 August, the FM wrote to Vraalsen, affirming that no further attacks would take place. But there were other indications that the Gogrial incident was still affecting the political climate in Khartoum, to the detriment of humanitarian operations. The possibility remained that, despite the FM’s assurances, attacks on OLS flights might continue.
We had by now resumed normal air service, doing both airdrops but also landing our aircraft to pick up and transport staff. I remember feeling uncomfortable despite the assurances from the MFA. What if the attacks were resumed? Sure enough, on 7 August
a WFP/OLS flight was attacked in Mapel, Bahr el Ghazal. The bombs missed the aircraft but damaged the runway. Mapel was such an unexpected target that it challenged previous assumptions about areas of vulnerability. After Mapel, all of southern Sudan seemed vulnerable. The time had come seriously to consider suspension of OLS flights.
The Security Coordinator’s Office in New York called me to say that they would back my recommendation to suspend. (I would recommend, UNSECOORD would endorse, and the SG would sign off on the actual decision). It was, they said, my call.
Still I hesitated. I felt I needed another piece of the puzzle in place before taking such a decision. Suspension was my call, but I needed the full backing of those operational agencies whose work would be affected, notably UNICEF and WFP. In order to be certain of their support, the decision to suspend was postponed by 24 hours, until 8 Aug, until I could explain what I was doing to those agencies at the highest levels in NY and Rome.
I spent the night of August 7/8 contacting UNICEF and WFP. I also cancelled most of the OLS flights for 8 Aug. By midnight I was left with three safe flights for the following day.
The following morning, 8 Aug., I received the assurances that I was seeking. At 4 pm Khartoum time, just as NY opened for business, I formally recommended suspension of all OLS flights.
This careful consensus building ensured that the decision was taken seriously in NY and in Rome by WFP.UNSECOORD backed the recommendation to suspend, and the UN Secretary-General approved it without delay. The same day, the Secretary General wrote to the President of Sudan explaining the reason why he had suspended flights, and urging the president to take the necessary steps that would permit their resumption. The president replied promptly, on 10 August, offering his regrets for the attacks, confirming his support for OLS, and expressing the hope that humanitarian flights could resume at the earliest possible moment.
The crisis was over. I met the FM on 12 August and requested him to ascertain how long it would take the military to issue instructions to its personnel on the front lines that would ensure the safety of the OLS flights. The FM came back suggesting 72 hours. OLS flights resumed on 16 Aug 2000.
Elizabeth Ferris
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement
14 September 2007
UN University’s launch of Humanitarian Diplomacy, edited by Larry Minear and Hazel Smith.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this distinguished panel to launch this important new book Humanitarian Diplomacy. I found the book to be a fascinating collection of diverse experiences which practitioners have talked about in an anecdotal fashion for many years. The concept of humanitarian diplomacy is a useful framework for analyzing diverse actions by different actors with different short-term objectives in virtually all regions of the world. And for people working in the humanitarian community, the book is a testament to the creativity and commitment of many people working in dangerous situations to get humanitarian relief to people in need
I would like to begin with one general comment and then focus on several issues related to NGOs and humanitarian diplomacy.
The general comment is a sense of sadness at the fragility of the humanitarian enterprise. As many have discussed and the studies in this volume illustrate, the very concept of humanitarianism is under siege. The perception that humanitarianism is a Western liberal invention rather than a universal norm erodes the protection formerly enjoyed by humanitarian actors.
The study on Afghanistan even charts the moment when the change came: “The Taliban’s predecessors had accepted humanitarian actors as relatively neutral and impartial players…For the Taliban, however, the targeting of civilians and the denial of access and humanitarian assistance became integral parts of their war strategy.” (p. 156) So too, other governments and warring parties have adopted similar policies; displacement of populations and denial of assistance has been a military strategy in situations as diverse as Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The extent to which humanitarian action is possible usually depends on the belligerents – how much they know about international humanitarian law or how much they perceive that respecting it will further their own interests.
The vagaries of conflict mean that the ability to provide assistance to large numbers of internally displaced persons and other civilians at risk often depends on the whims of a soldier at a checkpoint or a bandit hoping to make a buck. While humanitarian access can depend on the skill of the negotiators – as illustrated in this book -- it is more often determined by the belligerent forces. The truth is that humanitarians don’t have much leverage when negotiating with people with the guns. In the past, such protection was the result of a perception that it was in everyone’s interest to respect humanitarian neutrality, but that perception is clearly breaking down. Given current trends with resource wars and fragmentation of rebel movements, respect for international humanitarian law is not likely to improve.
The actions of humanitarian actors themselves can also impact on security and access – particularly their relations with governments. And in this respect, perceptions can be more important than the actual relationships. The study on Iraq, for example, illustrates the difficulties when the public perceives that humanitarian work is being conducted in support of political and military objectives – even when the relief agencies tried to distance themselves from the military efforts.
There are some who argue that we need to be uncompromising in our neutrality and impartiality as the only way of recovering humanitarian principles while others advocate a more pragmatic course.
I don’t know what the answer is – to go back to basics in reaffirming classic humanitarian principles or to ‘get innovative about how we do things’ as Claudia Rodriguez frames the debate in her study.
But the erosion of humanitarian principles and practice is certainly occurring and I fear that we are incrementally losing something very precious – humanitarian ideals. I also wonder about the extent to which humanitarian diplomacy itself may be contributing to this erosion.
In particular, the study on the Balkans raises the question of whether the negotiations which took place – which had to take place to secure access to those in need – may have contributed to the weakening of humanitarian principles.
Similarly, the study on Afghanistan refers to “unsavoury deals” while the chapter on Somalia raises the question of whether negotiating with warlords has the effect of legitimizing them. Humanitarian diplomacy is often based on compromise and yet compromising on basic humanitarian principles can weaken them.
Turning now to NGOs, there has been growing awareness over the last decade of the role NGOs play in protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and other civilians. The studies in this volume illustrate that international NGOs can and do use humanitarian diplomacy to protect and assist vulnerable people. But I was struck by the lack of reference to national NGOs in this volume.
With the exception of the study on Lebanon, national NGOs are hardly mentioned. I have argued recently that, in spite of the rhetoric of solidarity, international NGOs have more in common with UN agencies than with national or Southern NGOs.
This volume reinforces that argument, but I wonder about the extent to which these techniques also apply to national NGOs’ involvement with humanitarian diplomacy. National NGOs face different pressures and have different assets than national staff of international NGOs.
A second issue related to NGOs is coordination – a term which often seems to be an oxymoron. Almost all of the studies highlight the difficulties for humanitarian diplomacy when humanitarian actors pursue divergent approaches. NGOs in particular often do not feel bound by UN-negotiated agreements. For example, the study on Sudan illustrates that while Operation Lifeline Sudan was carefully negotiated with the Sudanese government and rebel forces, NGOs carried out their own airlifts which sometimes complicated the UN’s efforts.
The actions taken by one humanitarian actor can have consequences for others. I was also struck by the fact that even though there are different actors with different constituencies and mandates, in most situations the public perception is that humanitarian actors are all lumped in together.
As the study on ICRC’s role in East Timor noted, the arrival of hundreds of new NGOs complicated the humanitarian landscape. Today there are opportunities for humanitarian actors –Red Cross/Crescent societies, NGOs and UN agencies – to work more intentionally together through the recently-established Global Humanitarian Platform.
This is in everyone’s interest.
To the extent that the humanitarian community can adopt similar or complementary strategies – whether in Cambodia or East Timor or Colombia – the possibilities for effective humanitarian action are increased.
Finally, although I’m a big supporter of NGOs, I thought the book was quite gentle on the issues of NGO accountability and competition between NGOs. International NGOs – even very powerful NGOs – do not have the same accountabilities as governments or multilateral actors which makes coordination difficult. NGOs can often say ‘we can’t coordinate our work with you because we are accountable to our board of directors which has set different priorities.’
Competition between NGOs is, I believe, the biggest impediment to coordination. International NGOs compete with each other and with UN agencies for donor funding; they also compete with national NGOs.
This point is nuanced several times in the book, but I think it deserves more attention. Like many of you, I have seen many occasions where NGOs jockey for international press coverage because of the comparative advantage it gives them in fund-raising with the public.
And sadly, I have seen cases of NGOs withholding information from one another because information is, after all, power.
I am grateful to the editors for putting together this collection of studies on humanitarian diplomacy. They raise more questions than they answer – which is, of course, the mark of a good book.
